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By Mark T. Clark
Posted April 5, 2002
This article appeared in the Thursday, April 18th, 2002 edition of the Evening Times, Little Falls, NY.
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Now that the Bush administration appears serious about dealing with Iraq, and Iraq appears serious about acquiring nuclear missiles, it should come as no surprise that the Defense Department is rethinking how it might use its own nuclear arsenal. Most reporters however are "shocked, shocked" to discover that the administration is actually developing a thoughtful, detailed plan for determining how and when nuclear weapons should be used. The media's offended sensibilities are evident in their reporting on the administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
Classified parts of the NPR were leaked by an anti-military internet site and then picked up by the New York Times, Los Angeles Times, Fox News and others. It seems that the NPR — and thereby the Bush administration — "targeted" seven nations: Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria. Worse, according to the talking heads, the NPR called for new nuclear weapons to attack deeply buried, underground bunkers. Critics charge that the Bush administration is thereby more willing to break a longstanding taboo, making the use of nuclear weapons more likely. The NPR also calls for reserving deactivated, but not destroyed, nuclear weapons after reducing the overall inventory of active nuclear warheads to about 2,000. And it would be willing to do so regardless of whether Russian would sign an arms agreement accepting the U.S. posture.
Nuclear planning is nothing new, nor is the potential for conflict in international politics. What is new is the post-Cold War fantasy that nuclear planning is no longer necessary, even harmful. The Clinton administration conducted the last NPR in 1994. Its outdated Cold War framework was reflected in the Review's insistence that nuclear weapons were only good for deterring Russia. No thought was given to new and emerging nuclear powers. Long before India and Pakistan exploded nuclear weapons in 1998, Iraq came within 18 months of completing a nuclear device before the U.S. actively destroyed its program after the Gulf War. Since 1998, Iraq has been free from any inspection of its nuclear activities. And North Korea in 1994 violated its obligations under the Nonproliferation Treaty by diverting enough nuclear material for several nuclear bombs. In August 1998, it launched a prototype intercontinental ballistic missile.
Russia has been compelled by its weak economy to draw down its strategic nuclear forces. However, it has kept a huge nuclear arsenal of "tactical" nuclear weapons — as many as 15,000. The U.S., on the other hand, has fewer than 1,500. Many of Russia's tactical nukes have the size and destructive potential to be virtually indistinguishable from long-range nuclear missiles. Likewise, China has continued aggressively modernizing its nuclear arsenal. Iran has been developing the technical infrastructure for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. And before September 11, Bin Laden called the acquisition of nuclear weapons a "religious duty."
All of the states above, as well as Libya, have become expert at disguising their intentions. Intelligence estimates believe that these countries combined may have thousands of deeply buried, hardened, bunker complexes. In many cases, such complexes are not susceptible to destruction with conventional munitions.
U.S. nuclear deterrence policy must remain credible so long as nuclear weapons exist, which is to say always. Credibility consists of two things: the capability and the intention to use the forces you have. But it also must account for the changing face of international politics.
The new NPR plans for those changes. Whatever flaws may exist in the NPR, the ability to think about the "unthinkable" ought not be the cause of alarm. The real cause for concern is the policies and politics of the states mentioned in the NPR. Apart from Russia, which is still experimenting with democratic institutions, all of these states are non-democratic and hostile to the United States. Most have — or want — nuclear weapons. Literally all of them actively support terrorist organizations.
The clucking pundits should examine the NPR further. In it, the administration calls for a new "triad." Building on the old triple-delivery policy (bombers, land-based missiles, and nuclear-armed submarines), the administration wants a new deterrence policy built on three pillars: nuclear weapons,advanced conventional weapons that give the U.S. the capability to defeat nuclear-armed adversaries, and ballistic missile defense.
Until now, the U.S. relied on a variety of different arms control approaches to stem nuclear proliferation. But they worked only as states decided to forgo nuclear weapons development, and they ignored the politics of those regimes. For the new nuclear adversaries, a more robust deterrence and defense scheme is a must.
After September 11, the only outrage would be if the U.S. were not reconsidering the role of nuclear weapons.