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The June 8, 2010 California Ballot Measures: A Claremont Institute Analysis
We offer to our supporters and the public the following observations on the three most important ballot measures in the upcoming California primary election: Propositions 14, 15 and 16.
The Claremont Institute is a nonpartisan organization, recognized as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Claremont Institute does not endorse any candidate for political office. None of the Claremont Institute's writings or events should be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any proposition or any bill before the state legislature or the United States Congress or as an attempt to aid the election of any public official.
Proposition 14: The Top Two Candidates Open Primary Act
By Ben Boychuk
Imagine an election in which your only choice in November was between a liberal Democrat and a conservative Republican. It isn't hard to do. That scenario plays out in many California state assembly, state senate and congressional districts every election year.
Now imagine an election in which your only choice was between a liberal Democrat and a slightly more liberal Democrat. Or perhaps the contest is between a conservative Republican and a moderate Republican. Such scenarios are fairly commonplace in June primary election contests.
But if Proposition 14 passes on June 8, such contests would become regular occurrences in California's November general elections as well.
Prop. 14 would let voters choose any candidate, regardless of party registration, in an open primary election. The candidates with the two highest vote totals in the primary would compete in the fall. In effect, this would amount to a two-stage general election. Under Prop. 14, it would be possible—and in some districts, all but certain—for the top-two vote getters to emerge from the same political party. No longer would all parties be represented in the general election; and most third parties and all write-in candidates would be excluded. Candidates would be able, if they wished, to identify their preferred political party on the ballot. The initiative would affect all state offices and congressional races, but would not apply to party central committee elections or presidential primaries.
Californians experimented briefly with a somewhat different open primary in the late 1990s. Voters approved Prop. 198 in 1996, but the U.S. Supreme Court in 2000 said it violated political parties' First Amendment right to associate freely by choosing their nominees for office without the state-mandated participation of non-Republicans or non-Democrats. Prop. 14, however, mimics Washington state's model, which survived a U.S. Supreme Court challenge in 2008 (http://www.scotusblog.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/03/06-713.pdf). Briefly, the court ruled that the Washington law was constitutional because well-informed voters could distinguish between a candidate's own party-preference designation on the ballot and the actual nomination of a party (which in California under Prop. 14, as in Washington state, would no longer exist).
Best Arguments For Prop. 14
Supporters of Prop. 14 argue that the current system favors party activists and results in the nomination of candidates far to the left or right of the vast majority of California voters. An open primary would encourage moderation, backers say, by compelling candidates to appeal to a broad spectrum of voters, not just the most strident party faithful. And supporters point out, correctly, that more and more voters refuse to identify themselves as Republican or Democrat.
"When there's an open primary, a top two, you better have three qualities: be open-minded, be reasonable and be pragmatic, because now you have to connect with all the voters," says Lt. Gov. Abel Maldonado, a liberal Central Coast Republican and former state legislator who made ballot placement for Prop. 14 a condition of his 2009 vote in favor of a state budget that raised taxes by more than $13 billion. A reasonable argument can be made that because Prop. 14 will create a larger and less ideologically defined primary electorate in place of the two smaller and narrower ones we now have, candidates will need to work harder, at least in that stage of the campaign, than they normally do now.
It should be pointed out, though, that open primaries do not always lead to the most moderate candidates winning the nomination. Prop. 14 opponents point to the astonishing campaign of former Ku Klux Klansman David Duke, who beat out several centrist candidates in 1991 to win the Republican nomination for Louisiana governor.
Prop. 14 supporters also argue the measure would make California's elections more democratic by opening primaries to the 20 percent of the electorate—more than 3.4 million people—who identify as independent, "decline-to-state" voters. An open primary, proponents say, would give independents the ability to rally behind candidates who are not beholden to the particular ideologies or narrow platforms of one party or another.
It's worth noting, however, that independent is not synonymous with "nonpartisan" or even "moderate." Many independents associate themselves with far-left parties, such as the Green Party, while others align with the Libertarian, Natural Law or Reform parties, which have tiny memberships. In addition, although independent voters are a fast-growing segment of the voting population, they tend to identify with at least some positions of the major parties, and many are much closer to one party than the other.
The fact is, too, that primary elections tend to draw significantly fewer voters than general election contests, and those who do show up at the polls tend to be activists or fully engaged citizens—often fewer than 40 percent of voters, alas. Therefore, the same small, active group of voters would continue to select the only two candidates to appear on the November ballot.
Best Arguments Against Prop. 14
Opponents of Prop. 14, who include the Republican and Democratic parties, say the measure would limit voter choices, do nothing to diminish the power of incumbency or special-interest groups, and possibly conflict with other reforms.
A detailed study of Prop. 14 by the non-partisan but left-leaning Center for Governmental Studies arrived at three conclusions. First, based on current district lines and demographics, "more than one-third of all state legislative and congressional races could produce general election run-offs between two members of the same party." Second, most of those run-offs would involve Democrats. The reason is simple: California in 2008 had far more registered Democrats than Republicans (45 percent to 31 percent, according to the Secretary of State). Republican voters either would be left to choose between two candidates with whom they disagree, or simply skip the race in which this occurs, perhaps even staying home in November. (Obviously the same would be true for Democrats in the very small handful of districts that are the most Republican-dominated.)
Finally, the report concludes: "there might be some races in which a ‘top two, same party' general election run off could be close enough that voters from another party or [decline-to-state] voters could swing the election to a more moderate candidate." But that conclusion is the most speculative of the three, based largely on the growth of "decline-to-state" registration, which, again, does not necessarily reflect a centrist political outlook.
In addition, the Center for Governmental Studies report suggests Prop. 14's reforms would make California's elections even more expensive, because "candidates will seek to influence a broader spectrum of voters instead of just voters from their own political parties." (In 2008, the average general election campaign for state Assembly cost $888,491, according to the National Institute on Money in State Politics.) Viable candidates would find other means of paying the high cost of campaigning. In all likelihood, candidates would rely more on political action committees, thus undermining the goal of encouraging candidates who aren't beholden to Sacramento special interests.
There is also the question of whether the disappearance of official party designations might reduce the role of political principle in general elections. The November candidates would be the ones who were most popular with the entire voting public in June, not (as is true now) those who won approval from each party's voters as good representatives for that party. Success in the primary could more easily be based on personality, even on lack of definite positions, than tends to occur under the current system.
Redistricting as an Alternative to Open Primaries
If the source of a polarized state Legislature is overly partisan or gerrymandered districts, then one solution—voter-approved but as yet untested—might be the new independent Citizens Redistricting Commission (http://senweb03.senate.ca.gov/focus/redistricting/commission.aspx), which could produce fewer politically lopsided districts when it redraws district lines before the 2012 elections. California's Bureau of State Audits is currently reviewing thousands of applications to fill 14 seats on a bipartisan commission scheduled to begin work in December.
Fair districting would offer advantages that an open primary could not. Districts drawn in accord with population and geography, rather than rank partisan advantage, would make elections more competitive and open. Instead of effectively disenfranchising some voters in the general election with an open primary, a nonpartisan and relatively unbiased redistricting would encourage voters to turn out in the larger number of districts in which real competition is likely.
Among the supporters of Prop. 14 are Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, the California Chamber of Commerce, the California Business Roundtable, and the California Manufacturers & Technology Association. Among its opponents are the California Republican Party, the California Democratic Party, and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association.
Ben Boychuk is a syndicated columnist and a fellow of the Claremont Institute's Golden State Center for State and Local Government.
Proposition 15: The California Fair Elections Act
Voters are being asked to reopen the issue of public financing in California elections.
Proposition 15 would set up a pilot program for Secretary of State campaigns. More importantly, however, it would repeal the ban on public financing that the voters approved back in 1988. If Prop. 15 passes, the legislature—with the governor's approval or by overriding a veto—could enact a law setting up public financing across the board.
The predicted success or popularity of public financing in Secretary of State races could make this more likely. In addition, cities and counties in some cases could create public financing for local offices. Next Tuesday, then, Californians are really voting on an indirect authorization of public financing, not just a small experiment.
The arguments for public financing are: 1) that candidates spend too much time raising dollars, too little on the issues and building public support; and 2) that ordinary campaign money from special interests corrupts the political process. Supporters say a public financing system will reduce both problems. Candidates for Secretary of State—a job in which integrity is especially important because this official administers our elections—should be independent of special interests.
The arguments against it are: 1) that taxpayers shouldn't have to fund either candidates they don't support, or campaign ads and methods they don't like; and 2) that public financing tends to regiment the political process. Opponents further argue that public financing is an illusory reform because special-interest money can always have a large influence on elections—mainly through less-regulated independent expenditures that are relatively distanced from candidates and parties, less obvious to the voters, and harder to monitor than traditional campaign funds.
Prop. 15 would finance Secretary of State campaigns by levying a fee on lobbyists and their employers, essentially creating a new $350-a-year tax. If the amount raised in this way proves insufficient due to campaign circumstances or the number of candidates, money from the state's general fund, or other sources to be determined by the legislature, could be used.
The system would be voluntary. Candidates could participate or not. But if they took the public dollars, they couldn't raise or spend any other money. If a candidate who chose not to receive public financing outspent one who did, the publicly financed candidate would get more money than was initially provided. In the primary, each participating candidate would get $1 million for the primary and up to $4 million, as needed, to match non-publicly financed opponents. In the general election, the amounts would be $1.3 million and up to $5.2 million. A small amount of funding from parties would still be allowed.
Public financing would depend on a certain level of pre-existing support for a candidate—a requirement that might either discourage campaigns by non-established figures or force them to depend on special interests by shutting off the public-financing option. Candidates would be eligible for public financing only if they collected at least 7,500 five-dollar contributions.
Although the net result of Prop. 15 would likely diminish the special-interest role in the direct funding of Secretary of State races (which are not particularly big-money affairs to begin with), there is no guarantee especially when it comes to indirect funding. For instance, the Secretary of State Project backed by left-wing billionaire George Soros, which works to elect favored candidates to this office around the country, could have considerable clout in these campaigns through independent expenditures. In addition, self-funding candidates are protected under Supreme Court precedent. Publicly-financed candidates might not come close to matching their dollars.
Among Prop. 15's supporters are the League of Women Voters, the American Association of Retired Persons, the major public-employee union AFSCME, the California Labor Federation, the state chapter of the National Organization for Women, the NAACP, the Sierra Club, and a variety of Democratic party organizations. Among the opponents are the California Chamber of Commerce, the California Business Roundtable, the California Farm Bureau, the California Retailers Association, and the Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association.
Proposition 16: The Taxpayers Right to Vote Act
California's Proposition 16, according to the official summary:
Requires two-thirds voter approval before local governments provide electricity service to new customers or establish a community choice electricity program using public funds or bonds. Fiscal Impact: Unknown net impact on state and local government costs and revenues-unlikely to be significant in the short run-due to the measure's uncertain effects on public electricity providers and on electricity rates.
To say there have been a lot of television ads about Prop. 16 is an understatement. Pacific Gas & Electric has funded an intense, effective campaign to let California citizens know they should have a vote when it comes to the creation or expansion of municipal electricity companies. The nice lady on the Yes on 16 advertisements is about as familiar to Californians now as Jay Leno. Of course, this doesn't speak to the public policy implications of the measure.
Understanding the production and distribution of electricity is no simple matter. Indeed, it confused Governor Gray Davis to the point that his incompetence on the issue eventually caused him to be recalled.
California has investor-owned utilities such as Pacific Gas & Electric and Southern California Edison that are regulated by the state Public Utilities Commission.
We also have large municipal utilities such as the Sacramento Municipal Utility District and the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power. The former has an elected board of directors, the latter a board of commissioners appointed by the mayor and confirmed by the city council. There are also smaller municipal utilities that provide power throughout the state. All of these providers—investor-owned utilities, or municipal ones that distribute electricity over a grid and power lines under their own control—either produce power themselves or buy power from independent electricity producers.
As a general rule, competition is extremely effective at providing good and services at the lowest possible price. A system having more electricity producers is no exception. With the right system of long-term contracts—such as those that work in many other markets—these power providers should be able to buy electricity at lower prices from the power producers.
At issue with Prop. 16 is whether cities can become providers—replacing the existing utility companies such as PG & E or Southern California Edison either by contracting with independent electricity producers or by building power plants and becoming producers and distributors themselves.
The purpose of Prop. 16 is not to forbid such an establishment, but rather that citizens in a given city should be required to vote on it and approve it by a two-thirds majority. The logic here is that establishing a municipal electricity provider would require major commitments of capital and/or infrastructure and would encumber citizens for years into the future. Just as bonds require a two-thirds majority since they last for up to 30 years, so too should a multi-year financial investment by a city that would be getting into the electricity business.
The best argument against Prop. 16 is that city governments should be free to do as they please—since they are elected by the citizens—and that they would be better stewards of their citizens' interests than the executives of PG & E or Southern California Edison. In these anti-corporate times, this argument could be popular.
The counter argument is that PG & E and SCE are regulated now by the Public Utilities Commission and, however imperfect that system, still have to face public scrutiny of their actions, whether it is raising fees or passing on the cost of building necessary infrastructure.
Proposition 16 has been termed a P G & E power grab, but it is difficult to see why. With intense pressure to add new dollars to shrinking city budgets, it would be easy to see how cities might consider getting into the municipal electricity business to help fund city coffers. From a public policy perspective, Prop. 16 appears to be a straightforward attempt to require the consent of the citizens and a two-thirds majority when cities enter into major investments.
Among the measure's supporters are the California Taxpayers' Association, the California Chamber of Commerce and many local chambers of commerce, the Bay Area Business Roundtable, and the National Tax Limitation Committee. Among its opponents are the California Association of Realtors, the California League of Conservation Voters, the California Manufacturers & Technology Association, the state affiliate of the AFSCME public-employee union, the state Building and Construction Trades Council, and the California Labor Federation.
The Claremont Institute is a nonpartisan organization, recognized as tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code. The Claremont Institute does not endorse any candidate for political office. None of the Claremont Institute's writings or events should be construed as an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any proposition or any bill before the state legislature or the United States Congress or as an attempt to aid the election of any public official.
